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A: We endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model
of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique sym-
metric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading. Mechanisms
that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand (auc-
tions, bargaining, discount pricing, etc.) expose buyers to the "price risk",
the uncertainty of not knowing how much to pay in advance. Fixed price
trading eliminates the price risk, which is why risk averse customers accept
paying more to shop at such stores.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this note is to endogenize the pricing mechanism selection in
a model of directed search where buyers are risk averse. The adoption of a
particular mechanism signals how the seller intends to share the surplus ex-
post, which in turn influences the attractiveness of the store and pins down the
expected demand. So, it is natural to ask which trading protocol sellers would
choose when given the option.
Existing models endogenizing the trading mechanism selection using com-
petitive search seem to agree that a large number of mechanism are payoff
equivalent. Kultti [6], for instance, presents a model where sellers compete for
risk neutral buyers via fixed pricing or auctions and demonstrates that in equi-
librium both mechanisms yield the same expected payoff. Eeckhout and Kircher
[3] show that payoff equivalence is not specific to price posting and auctions,
rather it holds for a continuum of trading protocols all of which may be of-
fered in equilibrium.1 These models, however, exclusively focus on risk neutral
1The literature on competing mechanisms may be divided into two categories. The first
category focuses on a monopolist seller who selects a trading mechanism in order to maximize
his expected profit. The set of alternatives typically includes auctions, bargaining and price
posting. The approach is ‘partial equilibrium’ in that the demand is taken as given and
mechanisms feature exogenous costs. Among others see Wang [11, 12] and the references
therein. The second category, to which this paper belongs, has competitive environments
where demand at a store endogenously depends on the trading mechanism in place; for instance
see Eeckhout and Kircher [3], Kultti [6], McAfee [7], Peters [8].
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buyers. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that considers risk
averse buyers.
Risk aversion matters for the following reason. With directed search the
equilibrium matching function has the urn-ball form, as such some sellers receive
multiple customers while others receive no customer at all. If a trading protocol
prescribes the sale price as a function of the realized demand then it exposes
customers to what we call the price risk, the risk of not knowing how much
to pay in advance. Take for instance second price auctions, a frequently used
mechanism in the literature (e.g. Julien et al. [5]). It stipulates that if a single
customer is present then a reserve price is charged and in case of excess demand
bidding ensues; the winning customer pays a higher price than the reserve.
Customers who contemplate visiting such a store face an uncertainty regarding
how much to pay as they do not know in advance how many other buyers will
turn up at that store. Bargaining, add-on pricing, discount pricing etc. are
likewise; they all carry some degree of price risk.
Risk averse buyers dislike such uncertainty; therefore, all else equal, they
are more likely to shop at fixed price stores. The marginally higher demand
allows such stores earn more than their competitors which is why in the unique
symmetric equilibrium all sellers compete via fixed pricing.
2 Model
The setup is a standard directed search model where buyers are risk averse. The
economy is large and it consists of B identical buyers and S identical sellers.
Each seller is endowed with one unit of a good and wants to sell at a price above
his reservation price of zero. Similarly each buyer wants to purchase one unit
of an indivisible good and is willing to pay up to his reservation price, which is
normalized to one. The game proceeds as follows. First, sellers simultaneously
and independently announce a price schedule p = {pn}
B
n=1 that specifies a sale
price for each demand realization, i.e. pn is to be charged if n customers demand
the good. Then, buyers observe sellers’ selections and choose one store to visit;
however once they reach a store they cannot move elsewhere. If n customers
show up at the same location then each customers has a chance 1/n of obtaining
the good. If trade takes place at price p then the seller realizes payoff p and the
buyer u (1− p), where u satisfies u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. For simplicity let u (0) = 0.
Agents who do not trade earn zero. Once players realize their gains the game
ends.2
P		
 M
	: The vector p assigns a unique price pn for each n =
1, 2, .., B.We do not impose any restrictions on p except for requiring pn ∈ [0, 1] .
As such, our specification captures a wide range of pricing mechanisms and
provides sellers with substantial freedom in determining the terms of trade.
Some intuitive mechanisms are:
2The model is static; however, the result goes through in steady-states of a dynamic model.
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• Fixed Price Trading. The same price is charged for all demand realizations
i.e. pn = p for all n.
• Second price auctions. A "reserve price" p is charged if a single customer
shows up; in case of excess demand bidding ensues, i.e. p1 = p and pn = 1
if n ≥ 2.3
• Bargaining. Focus on the last stage of the game where customers have
already arrived at stores and consider a complete information bargaining
game Gn between a seller (central player) and n ≥ 1 buyers (peripheral
players) who wish to share a pie of size 1. Let qn be the resulting equilib-
rium price. If Gn has multiple equilibria and therefore generates multiple
sale prices then we assume that there is an equilibrium selection device
that uniquely pins down qn. The game, the selection device and the re-
sulting price schedule {qn}
B
n=1 are all common knowledge. So if a seller
communicates to the market that he competes via bargaining, then he can
be thought as posting p = {qn}
B
n=1 .
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• Add-on pricing. The sale price consists of a "base price" p plus an extra
bit that rises in excess demand. Consider for instance pn = p+(1− p)
n−1
n
.
• Discount pricing. The seller offers discounts by promising to charge only
a fraction of a "sticker price" p; the fewer the buyers the larger the dis-
count. Consider for example pn = p
(
1− 0.6
n+1
)
, which implies that a 30%
discount off the sticker price applies if a single customer turns up, a 20%
discount applies if two customers turn up, etc.
We would like to remind that set of available mechanisms is not restricted
to above; indeed p can be some esoteric sequence with no particular pattern at
all.
3 In the second price auction buyers bid their true valuation even if they are risk averse,
so the seller’s expected revenue is the same as with risk neutral bidders; see Fudenberg and
Tirole [4], Ch 6.
4We remain agnostic about the nature of Gn; it can be strategic or axiomatic. An example
for such a game can be found in Camera and Selcuk [2] who consider a discrete-time alternating
offers game (à la Rubinstein [10]) between a seller and n ∈ N customers. The game starts with
the seller making the initial offer q to a buyer. If the offer is accepted the seller obtains payoff
q, the buyer obtains 1− q and the game ends. Otherwise, in subsequent bargaining periods a
random device selects either the seller (with probability γ) or a buyer to propose a new price.
One can interpret the parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) as the seller’s bargaining power. Agents discount
the future by β ∈ (0, 1) and the game continues until an agreement is reached. This game has
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where agreement is reached immediately at
qn (γ, β) =
(n− β) [1− β (1− γ)]
n (1− β) + βγ (n− 1)
.
Observe that qn rises in n: multiple buyers "compete" for a single item and the price rises as
the competition stiffens.
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3 Analysis
We focus on strongly symmetric outcomes, where, on and off the equilibrium
path, buyers are indifferent to where they shop, and direct their search inde-
pendently across all sellers. Consider a seller who posts p and let v be the
probability that a representative buyer visits him. He meets exactly n buyers
with probability
zn(B, v) =
(
B
n
)
vn (1− v)B−n for n = 0, 1, ..B. (1)
Observe that in a small market the demand co-varies across sellers–if a store
has many customers then the next store is likely to have few customers. In a
large market, instead, the covariance dies out; hence the demand is i.i.d. across
sellers.
A buyer’s expected payoff at a store posting p equals to
U (p, v) =
B−1∑
n=0
zn(B − 1, v)
u (1− pn+1)
n+ 1
=
1
Bv
B∑
n=1
zn (B, v)u (1− pn) . (2)
With probability zn the buyer encounters n other buyers, so that the sale price
is pn+1 and the probability of being served is 1/ (n+ 1) . The second line is
obtained using the fact that zn(B − 1, v) = zn (B, v) /Bv.
The problem of a seller is given by
max
p∈[0,1]B , v∈[0,1]
B∑
n=1
zn (B, v) pn subject to U (p, v) = U. (3)
The seller’s objective is to maximize his profit, denoted by Π(p, v) , subject
to the indifference constraint U (p, v) = U , where U is the "market utility" of
buyers. Given some p the probability of visit v adjusts to satisfy the indifference
condition.5
Lemma 1 Fix v and U. A seller achieves the highest expected profits if he
commits to charge the same price for all n i.e. if he uses fixed price selling.
Proof. Once v is fixed the seller’s problem reduces to
max
p∈[0,1]B
L = max
p∈[0,1]B
B∑
n=1
zn (B, v) pn + µ
[
B∑
n=1
zn (B, v)u (1− pn)−BvU
]
.
5 In a large economy the market utility U is not affected by a deviation. The reason is that
the covariance of demand across stores vanishes; hence a change in the probability of visiting
a particular store does not affect the distribution of demand at other stores (see Burdett et
al. [1], Peters [9]).
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The FOC with respect to pn is given by
∂L
∂pn
= zn (B, v)− µzn (B, v)u
′ (1− pn) = 0.
Observe that
∂L
∂pn
= 0⇔ u′ (1− pn) = 1/µ for all n = 1, 2, .., B.
Hence, 1−pn must be constant for all n. This means that pn = p, i.e. the seller
must charge the same price no matter what the demand (fixed pricing).
Note that the objective function Π(p, v) is linear in p (recall that v is fixed)
whereas the constraint U (p, v) = U is concave in p. Indeed the Hessian of the
constraint is given by
H =

z1u
′′ (1− p1) 0 ... 0
0 z2u′′ (1− p2) ... 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
...
.
.
.
0 0 ... zBu
′′ (1− pB)
 .
Observe that H is negative definite (recall that u′′ < 0); therefore the solution
to the FOC yields the unique maximum.
Figure 1
Figure 1 illustrates the Lemma under the following restriction (which is
needed for a 2D illustration): p consists of two prices; p1 is to be charged
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if a single customer is present and p2 is to be charged if there are multiple
customers. The concave curves consist of combinations of p1 and p2 satisfying
the indifference constraint U (p, v) = U, whereas the linear lines are the isoprofit
curves.6 Observe that the optimal set of prices lie on the 450 line which means
that setting p1 = p2 yields the maximum profits.
The intuition behind the Lemma is this. The sale price pn generally changes
with the realized demand n. As such, customers face some uncertainty regarding
what price to pay, a notion which we label as the price risk. The price risk
critically depends on the trading mechanism in place; the more pn "fluctuates"
the higher the risk. The only mechanism that does not exhibit such risk is fixed
pricing; therefore, all else equal, risk averse customers are more likely to show
up at such stores. Fixed price sellers trade off this additional demand with
marginally higher prices and earn more than their competitors.
We can now state the main result of the paper.
Proposition 2 The unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed
pricing.
The proposition is based on the previous Lemma, so it has the same intuition.
Unlike the Lemma, though, the probability of visit is variable (as it should be),
which potentially complicates the comparison of expected profits across different
mechanisms. The proof tackles this issue.
Proof. We first show that no seller uses a trading mechanism other than fixed
price selling, then we argue uniqueness. By contradiction, suppose that there is
an equilibrium where a seller competes with some pricing mechanism p where
pn = pn˜ for some n, n˜. Let Π(p, v) denote his expected profits. The seller must
provide buyers with the market utility U , so v must satisfy U (p, v) = U. Below
we argue that if the seller switches to fixed price trading then he can attain
a higher level of profits than Π(p, v) rendering this outcome unsustainable as
an equilibrium. The main obstacle in reaching this conclusion is that if the
seller switches mechanisms then v changes, which renders the comparison of
expected profits non-trivial. To get around this issue we show that there exists
a particular fixed price r ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies U (r, v) = U . This means that if
the seller posts r, instead of p, then he can provide buyers with the same U and
he would still be visited with probability v. Once v is controlled for, the result
follows from Lemma 1. Below we make these arguments precise.
To start, observe that
U (r, v) =
1− (1− v)
B
Bv
u (1− r) ,
which is obtained by substituting pn = r, ∀n into (2). In addition we have
0 < U (p, v) <
1− (1− v)
B
Bv
u (1) . (4)
6The Figure is drawn for B = 100, v = 1.5%, U = 0.25 as well as U = 0.16. Buyers are
assumed possess exponential utility u (x) = 1− e−x.
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Indeed, given some v, the expected utility U (p, v) is maximized when pn = 0
for all n. Substituting p = 0 into (2) yields the inequality on the right hand
side. The inequality is strict because p is not a fixed pricing scheme; hence
at least some pn must be greater than 0. The second inequality is obtained
by substituting p = 1 into (2) (recall that u (0) = 0). Now define ∆(r) :=
U (r, v)− U and observe that ∆ decreases in r. Furthermore notice that
∆(0) =
1− (1− v)
B
Bv
u (1)− U > 0 and ∆(1) = −U < 0.
These inequalities follow from (4) and the fact that U (p, v) = U. The Inter-
mediate Value Theorem implies that there exists some r ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
U (r, v) = U.
Given that U (p, v) = U (r, v), Lemma 1 implies that Π(r, v) > Π(p, v) ,
which means that the seller can profitably deviate to fixed pricing. Hence there
is no equilibrium where another mechanism is offered.
The uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium immediately follows from the
facts that (i) agents are homogenous (ii) all sellers must use fixed price trading,
and (iii) buyers use symmetric visiting strategies.
The proposition implies that the only possible equilibrium of this game is
where all sellers compete via fixed pricing. To characterize this equilibrium
suppose that u satisfies u (x) = xα, where α ∈ (0, 1) and observe that a lower
value of α means that buyers are more risk averse. Using rather standard
techniques (e.g. see Burdett et al. [1]) one can show in the unique symmetric
equilibrium all sellers post
r∗ =
1− z0 − z1
1− z0 − (1− α) z1
and all buyers visit each seller with probability v∗ = 1/S.Observe that dr∗/dα <
0 which means that sellers ask for more as buyers become more risk averse;
indeed limα→0 r∗ = 1.
R	 Nusc Busc. One can show that if buyers are risk neutral then any
price schedule p∗ that satisfies
Π(p∗, 1/S) = 1− z0 − z1 (5)
may be posted in equilibrium. Indeed any such p∗ provides buyers with the
same market utility U = (1− 1/S)
B−1
; therefore buyers visit each store with
the same probability v∗ = 1/S.
The key to this result is that risk neutral buyers are not sensitive to the
aforementioned price risk. Any mechanism that delivers the expected utility U
receives the same attention from the customers, which is why in equilibrium a
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continuum of mechanism may be offered.
Figure 2
Figure 2 illustrates this result for B = S = 100. Similar to the previous
picture, the figure is drawn under the restriction that p = {p1,p2} , where p1
is the price for a single customer and p2 is the price for multiple customers.
The downward sloping solid line consists of combinations of p1 and p2 satisfying
(5) which means that, when buyers are risk neutral then any point on that
line maybe offered in equilibrium. For comparison we have highlighted the
equilibrium prices for some of the mechanisms outlined in the introduction (fixed
price trading, discount pricing and auctions).
4 Conclusion
The message of this note is simple. Fixed price trading is the best performing
protocol when sellers compete for risk averse buyers, because it eliminates the
price risk, the uncertainty of not knowing how much to pay in advance.
The result however comes with a caveat. The proofs depend on the "market
utility" assumption: each seller takes as given that he must provide buyers with
a certain level of utility and understands that a deviation by a particular store
simply cannot not affect buyers’ outside options. This is indeed true in an large
market. However in a small market with few buyers and sellers the market
utility assumption does not hold.
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